Oil and Gas - Proration - The Railroad Commission\u27s Authority to Protect Correlative Rights by Ungerman, Steven Alan
SMU Law Review
Volume 21
Issue 1 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 28
1967
Oil and Gas - Proration - The Railroad
Commission's Authority to Protect Correlative
Rights
Steven Alan Ungerman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation




the actions of its members it will lose all semblance of solidarity and thus
reduce its effectiveness in representing its members. 'Whether practically
the requisite union discipline can be maintained without resorting to ju-
dicially enforced fines is difficult to determine. Opponents argue that the
national labor policy is based on the theory that the primary means
through which a union maintains solidarity and control should be through
persuasion and common purpose, not through measures which amount to
coercion. As the Seventh Circuit majority stated: "All the protections
which Congress has seen fit to throw about the union member operate to
diminish the authority and power of the union to police its members by
coercion and to that degree impose on the union the burden of achieving
its ends by persuasion rather than by penal exaction. '
John Esch
Oil and Gas - Proration - The Railroad Commission's
Authority To Protect Correlative Rights
Under exceptions to the spacing rule the Railroad Commission permitted
the small tract operators in the Appling Gas Field to make multiple com-
pletions from a single well bore in each of the several reservoirs underly-
ing the field.' Drainage took place in the wells with multiple completions
and distorted the producing capacity of the small tract wells. This enabled
the small tract operators to file producers' forecasts far in excess of what
the true delivery capacity of the wells would have been in the absence of
such communication. As a result, the reservoir allowables assigned were so
great that the large tract wells were incapable of producing the allowable
representing their fair share of the gas as determined by the allocation
formula in effect.' Accordingly, the large tract wells were classified as
limited capacity wells and assigned allowables according to the maximum
amount they were capable of producing. The remainder of the allowables
to which they were entitled under the allocation formula was reallocated
among the small tract wells, enabling them to produce far more of the
43 358 F.2d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 1966).
'Benz-Stoddard v. Aluminum Co. of America, 368 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1963) held that each of
the vertically separated reservoirs underlying the Appling Gas Field was to be considered as a sepa-
rate reservoir in determining the right to a rule 37 exception and upheld the action of the Railroad
Commission in allowing the small tract operators to make multiple completions from a single well
bore, even though production from a single completion would have enabled them to recover more
than the quantity of gas underlying their lands.
The allocation formula provided for one-third of the pool allowable divided equally among the
wells and two-thirds in the proportion that the individual well bore to the total field acreage.
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reservoir allowable than their share as determined by the allocation for-
mula. The drainage advantage already enjoyed by virtue of the formula'
was thereby enhanced. The large tract owners asked the Railroad Com-
mission to remedy the situation by promulgating a formula restricting the
weight to be given to producers' forecasts in determining market demand,
and thereby ending the classification of the large tract owners' wells as
limited capacity wells." The effect of the formula adopted by the Com-
mission was to permit the large tract wells to receive only the allowable
they would be capable of producing. The small tract owners brought suit
in the District Court of Travis County, where the special order of the
Commission was declared invalid, and a direct appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court of Texas.' Held, affirmed: The Railroad Commission cannot
establish by a special order a ceiling on monthly allowable of gas to be
produced from a reservoir for the purpose of protecting correlative rights.
Railroad Comm'n v. Woods Exploration f Producing Co., 405 S.W.2d
313 (Tex. 1966).0
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Texas adheres to the doctrine of ownership in place of oil and gas. The
landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and
gas in place beneath his land.' Because of the migratory character of oil and
gas, the rule of absolute ownership in place, of necessity, is tempered by
the rule of capture. The rule is that the owner of a tract of land acquires
title to the oil or gas which he produces from the wells bottomed on his
'Railroad Comm'n v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1964) held that the
large tract owners in the Appling Gas Field were precluded by a lapse of time from attacking the
allocation formula, even though use of the formula allowed the wells on the small tracts to drain
substantial quantities of gas from the larger units. See Halbouty v. Railroad Comm'n, 163 Tex.
417, 357 S.W.2d 364 (1962) and Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 162 Tex. 274, 346
S.W.2d 801 (1961) which held that a one-third-two-third allocation formula resulting in the
drainage of a large tract owner's gas by a small tract owner was unconstitutional and void as con-
stituting the confiscation of property without due process of law and denial of equal protection of
the law. Accord, Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1964) (50-50 formula).
' Railroad Comm'n v. Woods Exploration & Producing Co., 405 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex. 1966).
The daily reasonable market demand for gas for each of the mentioned fields shall
be the lesser gas volume figure as determined either by summation of nominated vol-
umes taken from producers' forecast, or by dividing the reported productive capability
as shown on the GWT-2 test of the well exhibiting the greatest ability to deliver gas
to normal gathering facilities by the participation factor of the largest proration unit.
5 Tex. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6049c, S 8 (1962) (suits authorized in a court of competent
jurisdiction in Travis County by persons aggrieved by Commission's regulations or orders); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1738a (1962) (direct appeals to Texas Supreme Court in injunction
cases involving validity of administrative order).
6 The Supreme Court of Texas has entered an order staying its mandate in order to permit the
Railroad Commission and the large tract owners to submit a petition for writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court.
7 Lemar v. Garner, 121 Tex. 502, 50 S.W.2d 769 (1932); Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co.,
118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929); Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 113 Tex. 247, 254 S.W.
296 (1923); Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915).
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land,. though part of the oil or gas might have migrated from adjoining
lands.! Since both the ownership in place doctrine and the rule of capture
involve property rights,' neither can be infringed upon except in a proper
administration of state conservation laws under the police power.0 Prior to
governmental regulation, the landowner was privileged to drill as many
wells as he pleased and he could drill as close to his property line as he
pleased without liability to his neighbor.' 1 Further, each owner could use
artificial means to stimulate production if noninjurious to neighboring
reservoirs."' The landowner was allowed to do this because his neighbor
was privileged to do likewise under the rule of capture.
II. REGULATION
In order to conserve the oil and gas resources of the state, the Railroad
Commission promulgated statewide rule 37, the spacing regulation." Rule
37 provides for one well per forty-acre tract, 4 but it authorizes the Com-
mission to grant exceptions to permit drilling on smaller tracts in order
to prevent waste or the confiscation of property." Through the exceptions
each landowner is allowed a fair chance to exercise his common law right,
under the Texas theory of absolute ownership of minerals in place, to re-
cover the oil and gas in and under his land.
0Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948); see also Ryan Consol.
Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex. 221, 285 S.W.2d 201 (1956); Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, rehearing overruled, 126 Tex. 296, 87 S.W.2d 1069 (1935);
Stephens Co. v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923) (rule of capture
in conjunction with ownership in place); General Crude Oil Co. v. Harris, 101 S.W.2d 1098 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937), error dismissed.
'Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, rehearing overruled, 126
Tex. 296, 87 S.W.2d 1069 (1935); Halbouty v. Dorsey, 326 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)
error ref. nre.
'sCorzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2a 961 (1945); Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, rehearing overruled, 126 Tex. 296, 87 S.W.2d 1069 (1935).
"Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, rehearing overruled, 126
Tex. 296, 87 S.W.2d 1069 (1935).
"Comanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 298 S.W. 554 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1927) (shooting the well); United Carbon Co. v. Campbellsville Gas Co., 230 Ky. 275, 18 S.W.2d
1110 (1929) (using a compressor for gas). But see Grayce Oil Co. v. Peterson, 128 Tex. 550, 98
S.W.2d 781 (1936), affirming 37 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (Railroad Commission's rule
(now statewide rule 23) prohibiting use of vacuum pumps for the purpose of putting vacuum on
any gas or oil bearing stratum with certain exceptions was not in violation of the Texas Constitu-
tion).
'Statewide Rule 37, Tex. R.R. Comm'n Rules & Regs. (as amended 1965).
14 Rule 37 governs spacing until special rules, called "field rules," are made for an area after
a hearing. The spacing provisions of the field rules may or may not differ from the statewide rule.
'5 See Comment, Appeals From Proration Orders for Small Tract Wells, 19 Sw. L.J. 304 (1965);
note that the tract must have a separate existence prior to the application of the spacing rule to
the area to be entitled to an exception well to prevent confiscation. See Dailey v. Railroad Comm'n,
133 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error ref. In other words a small tract created after rule 37
becomes applicable to the territory or with an intent to evade the rule is not entitled to an ex-
ception. See Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73 (1939).
"Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948); Corzelius v. Harrell,
143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945); Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Rif. Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131
Since rule 37 prevents a landowner from protecting himself against
drainage by drilling additional wells and employing the rule of capture, it
became necessary for the state to protect correlative rights through regu-
lation.'7 To this end, section 10 of article 6008 provides that the Commis-
sion shall prorate and regulate the daily gas well production from each
common reservoir for the protection of public and private interest in the
prevention of waste and in the adjustment of correlative rights.'" The Su-
preme Court of Texas has held that section 10's authorization to protect
correlative rights is constitutional and is not dependent upon the existence
of waste." Thus, the Commission is able to offset the initial advantage ob-
tained by one who is given an exception to the well-spacing rule by limit-
ing his production, and as a result, to afford each owner the opportunity
of recovering his just proportion of oil and gas underlying his land."
Section 11 of article 6008 provides that the Commission shall exercise
the authority given in section 10 to prorate and regulate so as to adjust
correlativc rights when the potential capacity of the wells to produce gas
from a common reservoir exceeds the market demand for gas from such
reservoir." Section 12 of article 6008 then provides for a hearing each
month to determine (1) the lawful-market demand for gas to be produced
from such reservoir during the following month and (2) the volume of
gas that can be produced without waste. The Commission is then ordered
to fix the monthly reservoir allowable for gas at the lawful market demand
or at the volume that can be produced without waste, whichever is the
S.W.2d 73 (1939); Railroad Comm'n v. Gulf Prod. Co., 134 Tex. 122, 132 S.W.2d 254 (1939);
Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, rehearing overruled, 126 Tex. 296,
87 S.W.2d 1069 (1935) (exceptions to rule 37 may be granted to -protect any property against
undue drainage by reason of the operation of wells of any other operator); Colorado Interstate
Gas Co. v. Sears, 362 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error ref. n.r.e.; Halbouty v. Dorsey,
326 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smith, 145 S.W.2d 280
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error ref.; Atlantic Oil Prod. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 85 S.W.2d 655
(Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error dismissed.
"
7 Benz-Stoddard v. Aluminum Co. of America, 368 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1963). The very validity
of rule 37 and the exceptions thereto is based upon the principle that the Railroad Commission can
so regulate the flow of the gas that no unreasonable hardship need result from its application.
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 96 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error dis-
missed. The Railroad Commission has power to regulate flow of oil wells to correct inequality existing
between neighboring leases, and it is a more practical method than that of allowing additional wells
as exceptions to the spacing rule. Sun Oil Co. v. Gillespie, 85 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935)
error dismissed. See Comment, Proratioi in Texas: Conservation or Confiscation?, 11 Sw. L.J. 186
(1957).
" TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6008, § 10 (1962).
"Corzelius v. Harrell, 179 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), reversed on other grounds, 143
Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945); See also Henderson v. Terrell, 24 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Tex.
1938).
"Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961), affirming 337
S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d
935, rehearing overruled, 126 Tex. 296, 87 S.W.2d 1069 (1935); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v.
Sears, 362 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.c.; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Rail-
road Conm'n, 96 S.W.2d 664 (Tea. Civ. App. 1936).
"TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6008, S 11 (1962).
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smaller quantity. The monthly reservoir allowable is to be allocated so as
to give each well its fair share of the gas to be produced from the reser-
voir.
22
The Commission promulgated statewide rule 31 for fixing the monthly
gas allowable for a reservoir. Under this rule, market demand is primarily
determined on the basis of producers' forecasts of operators having wells in
the reservoir. These forecasts state the volume of gas each operator ex-
pects to be able to market the following month and are limited only by
the delivery capacity of his wells. If the Commission concludes that use
of the forecasts does not result in a correct determination of reasonable
market demand for the reservoir, it may take into account other pertinent
facts.23 Section 13 of article 6008 sets out the factors to be used by the
Commission in determining daily allowable for each gas well.' It also pro-
vides that all other factors which are pertinent may be considered in de-
termining the daily allowable production for each gas well."
The Supreme Court of Texas has recognized that the legislature gave
the Commission broad discretion in the exercise of its power of prorating
and regulating the production of gas from a common reservoir, so that it
would not be bound by any narrow and technical rules in carrying out
the objects of article 6008." On the other hand, an order of the Railroad
Commission must be bottomed on a specific grant of power either con-
tained in the constitution or delegated to it by the legislature. -In par-
ticular, the Commission has the power to allocate production of gas among
2 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6008, S 12 (1962).
Z Statewide Rule 31, Tex. R.R. Comm'n Rules & Regs. itself states: "Nothing herein shall be
interpreted, however, as binding on the Commission to the extent that any adjustment of nomina-
tions cannot be made which is deemed necessary to adjust the production of- gas to an amount
equal to market demand as is required of the Commission by the Statutes."
24TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6008, § 13 (1962).
In determining the daily allowable production for each gas well, the Commission
shall take into account the size of the tract segregated with respect to surface position
and common ownership upon which such gas well or wells are located; the relation
between the daily producing capacity of each gas well and the aggregate daily capacity
of all gas wells producing the same kind of gas in the same common reservoir or zone;
and all other factors which are pertinent; . . .
2"E.g., recoverable reserves, see Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 346 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.
1961); Railroad Comm'n v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 193 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946)
error ref. n.r.e.
" Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 6008, § 1 (1962).
Sec. 1. In recognition of past, present, and imminent evils occurring in the pro-
duction and use of natural gas, as a result of waste in the production and use thereof
in the absence of correlative opportunities of owners of gas in a common reservoir
to produce and use the same, this law is enacted for the protection of public and
private interests against such evils by prohibiting waste and compelling ratable
production.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6008, § 22 (1962): "Sec. 22. The Commission shall be vested
with a broad discretion in administering this law, and to that end shall be atthorized to adopt any
and all rules, regulations or orders which it finds are necessary to effectuate the provisions and
purposes of said law."
27 Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan Oil Co., 152 Tex. 439, 259 S.W.2d 173 (1953).
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producers in a particular field but must base its proration order on the fac-
tors prescribed by the statute."s
III. RAILROAD COMM'N V. WOODS EXPLORATION & PRODUCING Co."
Waste was not involved in Woods, and the court narrowed the issue to
whether the formula" adopted for determining maximum market demand
was beyond the Commission's delegated authority. The large tract owners
contended that since the declared purpose of the law was the protection of
public and private interests by prohibiting waste and compelling ratable
production,3 1 the Commission might properly consider the protection of
correlative rights as one of the relevant factors in determining reasonable
market demand. The court reasoned that the legislature intended the
Commission not to be concerned with correlative rights unless it first found
that potential production was in excess of reasonable market demand."
Since the monthly reservoir allowable of gas is to be fixed at the lawful
market demand or at the volume that can be produced without waste,
whichever is the smaller quantity," the court concluded that the authority
granted to the Commission in determining monthly reservoir allowable
was not enlarged by the broad authority and discretion suggested by the
more general provisions."4 The court relied on Rudman v. Railroad
Cornm'n' in saying that the correction or relaxation of the requirements
in determining allowables was a legislative matter if the allowables fixed
thereby was seriously fallible. The court also deemed it significant that the
Commission, in allocating the reservoir allowable among the wells, was au-
thorized to consider the size of the tracts, the productive capacity of the
wells, and all other pertinent factors,"' but was not given similar authority
in fixing the reservoir allowable. Therefore, the court concluded that the
legislature did not intend to authorize production from a reservoir to be
limited to less than reasonable market demand except for the prevention
of waste."
5
sChenoweth v. Railroad Comm'n, 184 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.
s9 Railroad Comm'n v. Woods Exploration & Producing Co., 405 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. 1966).
a0 See note 4 supra.
3 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6008, 5 1 (1962); see note 26 supra.
"aTEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6008, 5 11 (1962); see note 21 supra and accompanying
text.
33 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6008, § 12 (1962); see note 22 supra and accompanying text.
a'TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6008, §§ 1, 22 (1962); see note 26 supjra.
35 162 Tex. 579, 349 S.W.2d 717 (1961).
"0TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN,. art. 6008, § 13 (1962); see note 24 supra.
" The court stated that this conclusion was further supported by the history of Texas oil
and gas laws. The 1932 statute excluded economic waste from the term "waste" and prohibited
the Commission from, directly or indirectly, limiting the production of oil to the existing market
demand. The court reasoned that it was rather difficult to believe that when the legislature finally
authorized the Commission to limit production to' reasonable market demand, it meant that an
even lower figure might be set whenever the Commission concluded that the same would constitute
a reasonable reservoir allowable under all the circumstances.
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One dissenting opinion contended that neither article 6008 nor any
section thereof withheld from the Commission the power to adjust cor-
relative rights, either expressly or by implication." In fact the Commis-
sion is granted broad discretion in administering the law, ' and in this
situation it decided to modify statewide rule 31, as the rule authorizes,"°
to alleviate the manipulation and distortion that the use of producers' fore-
casts caused in determining reasonable market demand. Further support is
found in article 6042, which states that "particular powers herein granted
to the Commission shall not be construed to limit the general powers con-
ferred by law, ... ."" The first dissenter concluded that Woods presented a
situation in which the legislature intended the Commission to act so as
ultimately to give each operator, small or large, his fair share of the gas
in the reservoir. "'
The second dissent emphasized that the Commission must have made a
finding that productive capacity of the wells exceeded market demand
before it promulgated a proration order for the field.' Therefore, all the
broad powers and discretion conferred upon the Commission to prorate
and regulate the production of gas to adjust correlative rights should have
come into effect.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE MINERAL INTEREST POOLING ACT
Clearly, the result in Woods was dependent upon statutory construction.
The Commission attempted to protect the large tract owners' equities, rely-
ing on the broad discretion purportedly granted, but the court preferred a
narrow construction of the statute.
Since an oil or gas proration formula is subject to the continuous super-
vision of the Railroad Commission and may be changed at any time, either
upon the Commission's own motion or upon application of interested par-
ties, ' the Commission could have avoided the problem in Woods by prom-
3s See note 26 supra for an indication that article 6008 was promulgated, in part, to protect
correlative rights.
" TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6008, § 22 (1962); see note 26 supra.
40 See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
41 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6042 (1962); in the first dissent the writer distinguished
the Rudman case, on which the majority relied, by saying that it merely held that the field allow-
able must be determined in advance of the month to which it is applicable and that it cannot be
determined retroactively after the month has expired.
'Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962); Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex.
509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945); Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73
(1939); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 128 Tex. 189, 96 S.W.2d 273 (1936);
Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, rehearing overruled, 126 Tex.
296, 87 S.W.2d 1069 (1935).
'See note 3 supra. The second dissent reasoned that it was unlawful for the small tract owners
to include in their producers' forecasts gas to be taken from under the lands of others. However,
this practice is lawful due to the rule of capture. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
'Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1964); Railroad Comm'n v.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 193 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref. .r.e.
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ulgating a new proration order. But courts will not compel the Commis-
sion to change its orders, and the Commission has been rather reluctant to
do so in the past.
Recently the Texas Legislature passed a new statute which might serve
as a solution in the future to the problem presented in Woods. The Mineral
Interest Pooling Act' was passed in furtherance of the idea that each per-
son is entitled to recover his fair share of the minerals under his land. Pre-
viously, there had been a provision for voluntary pooling, but no person
could be compelled or required to enter into such an agreement.' The new
statute authorizes the Railroad Commission to establish a unit and to pool
all of the interests therein to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, to
protect correlative rights, or to prevent waste. The statute provides that
production be allocated on the basis of surface acreage unless such alloca-
tion does not allocate to each tract its fair share, in which event the Com-
mission is authorized to so allocate the production that each tract will re-
ceive its fair share. The statute also provides for a distribution of the costs.
Since the Pooling Act does not apply to any reservoir discovered and pro-
duced prior to March 8, 1961, it does not apply to the parties in the Woods
case.
While the court said in Woods that it did not mean to suggest that rea-
sonable market demand must always be fixed at the mathematical total of
producers' forecasts for the month and that the Commission might con-
sider and give appropriate weight to all factors that would be relevant to
the determination of reasonable market demand, it stated that correlative
rights, one of the most important factors, might not be considered as one of
the factors in the determination of -market demand. Since neither "reason-
able market demand" nor "lawful market demand" is defined in the sta-
tute, nor are the factors to be followed in determining either of them
enumerated, the Commission under its broad powers and discretion should
be able to determine its own reasonable definitions and the factors to be
considered in specific cases. Among these reasonable factors should be the
protection of correlative rights.
Steve Alan Ungerman
'TEx. REv. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 6008c (Supp. 1966); Smith, The Texas Compulsory Pooling
Act, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 1003 (1965) (Pt. I), 44 TEXAS L. REV. 387 (1966) (Pt. II).
"TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6008b (1962).
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